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SUMMER ONLY PROGRAM ,

The Central Intelligence Agency's Summer Only Program is a restricted program utilizing the dependents of Agency employees in clerical-type tasks during the summer months. Non-Agency dependents are excluded from consideration. There could be comments by some that such a program is characteristic of nepotism.

We have always justified our use of Agency dependents only for our Summer Only Program on the basis of security factors. It is apparently easier to conduct a security investigation on a dependent, as we have information on the parents already on file. Also, we admit for consideration for this program only dependents who are living with the Agency sponsor -- the reason being that we believe there will be suitable controls as regards conduct, protection of security information, etc.

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SPECIAL SELECTIVE SERVICE DEFERMENTS
FOR AGENCY EMPLOYEES

In the early days of the Agency it was determined that it would be necessary to establish special procedures for certain employees selected for assignment overseas. The Agency never sought exemption from the service for its personnel, only control over the timing of the military service so that cover of its assigned missions would not be adversely affected. The official History of the Mobilization and Military Personnel Division reflects a meeting on 25 June 1950 between Major General Hershey, Director of Selective Service, and the Director of Personnel of CIA, Mr. William J. Kelly. Mr. Kelly recorded this meeting on 28 July 1950 in a memorandum for the record, in which he sets forth the basic policies and procedures concurred in by General Hershey as follows:

"(1) There would be no formal inter-office correspondence on the subject of special deferment agreements for CIA personnel. General Hershey was concerned over the resultant criticism if these agreements were to become public knowledge.

"(2) The Agency would designate one officer who would be responsible for CIA approval of each deferment and who would personally handcarry each request directly to General Hershey. The Agency initially designated the Director of Personnel as the responsible officer. General Hershey subsequently designated Colonel Daniel O. Omer, General Counsel, Selective Service System, as his authorized contact in these matters; and CIA appointed the Executive Officer/Office of the Director of Personnel as the Agency's responsible officer.

"(3) "Special" deferments would be arranged for employees overseas on secret missions of such a nature that their duties could not, in the national interest, be divulged to the Selective Service System. Requests for deferments on this type of employee were approved only when the individual was scheduled to depart for overseas

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assignments within six months after such deferment was requested. General Hershey agreed to accept all requests for deferments without question as to where the employee was assigned or what duties he was performing. He held CIA honor-bound to submit deferment requests only on individuals who were eligible under criteria agreed upon.

"(4) General Hershey stated that he would arrange individual deferments in a manner of his own choosing. He indicated that he would either direct the State Directors of Selective Service to classify the individual as a "Directed 4-F," or General Hershey, himself, would ask that files be sent to National Selective Headquarters where he would "sit on them." He would then issue a Directed 4-F classification for the individual.*

"(5) The Agency agreed that deferments arranged under the special agreement with General Hershey would be canceled by CIA within 30 days after a deferred employee returned from overseas. The Directed 4-F classification card signed by General Hershey would be returned to his office.

"(6) Upon initiation of a request for deferment to General Hershey, the individual was prohibited from corresponding with his local board. All contacts with his local board had to be made through CIA and General Hershey's office. National Selective Service Headquarters would then handle local board contacts."

Subsequent to this period, there were frequent meetings with minor changes during the years. For instance, when the draft quotas had to be increased because of the Vietnam War, Colonel Omer of Selective Service Headquarters asked that Agency employees not be allowed to volunteer for overseas service with the Agency to avoid military service. An Office of Personnel Memorandum was issued in November 1967 which said, in substance, we would not ask for special draft classifications for employees who cannot complete the scheduled overseas tour and return to the jurisdiction of their local board prior to age 26. There were times when discussions between Agency officials and the Selective Service became lengthy and involved, such as in the case of

* A Directed 4-F classification is a category whereby the Director of Selective Service could direct deferments on individuals involved in national security work for the US Government.

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The history of this program reflects that General Hershey undertook the responsibility of serving Agency requests on the basis of an honor system -- trusting the Agency's word that a case was completely justifiable. Representatives of the Office of Personnel who dealt over the years with Selective Service Headquarters made every effort to be scrupulous in applying stringent criteria to requests for deferment.

We estimate that 150 employees may have been granted deferments from the period 1950 until it was decided that the nation would not have a compulsory draft system in the early 1970's. The reason we give you an estimated figure is that the recordkeeping system in MMPD in the past was such that destruction of some of the cards was accomplished after the individual employee returned from his overseas tour and once again resumed his direct relationship with his local Selective Service board.

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